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Abstract In this paper, we study ﬁrst-price sealed-bid procurement auctions for divisible items.
The auctions are divided into two cases: the auctioneer either does or does not compensate for an
oversupply of the quantity purchased. The bidding behaviors of bidders are modeled, and then the
optimal bidding strategy for bidders is obtained. It is shown that the bidder’s bidding price exists
and is increasing in his cost. Moreover, we show that the bidder can gain more proﬁt in cases where
the auctioneer compensates the overage supply quantity.
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1 Introduction
Auctions have been widely used by many companies and government departments to
purchase goods or services. In this paper, we study ﬁrst-price sealed-bid procurement
auctions for divisible items. In practice, many items are divisible, e.g., electric power.
Moreover, multiple items can be seen as divisible items when the purchase quantity is
large enough.
In a sealed-bid procurement auction for divisible items, each bidder submits his bid to
the auctioneer (who acts as the buyer). The bid includes a bidding price and the quantity
to be supplied. Usually, the auctioneer needs a large enough number of items or quantity
such that any one bidder can not satisfy the bidder’s need. After bidders’ bid, the auc-
tioneer purchases a demand quantity from bidders’ based on ascending order of bidding
prices submitted by bidders. The bidding price of the last bidder who satisﬁes the demand
quantity is said to be the market clearing price. All bidders whose bidding prices are lower
than the market clearing price sell their supply quantities to the auctioneer, and so they
are winners or winning bidders. In the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions, the trade-off price
is the winning bidders’ own bid prices.
In auctions for divisible items, it is usually impossible that the winning bidders’ total
supply quantity is exactly equal to the auctioneer’s demand. There is a gap between the
total supply of all winning bidders and the demand of the auctioneer, and so the auctioneer
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Copyright © 2009 ORSC & APORC, pp. 409–416may need only a part of some bidder’s supply. That is, there is an oversupply. In order to
bridge this gap, the auctioneer has alternatives. The ﬁrst is to compensate the oversupply
with a trade-off price. This is widely used in procurement auctions for such items as
electric power, for which once the bidder produces his product, the production capacity
must not be less than a certain quantity. The other is not to compensate for an oversupply.
Zhang, et al. (2000) discussed a game between power generators and the power com-
pany, in which generators submit their bids to the power company, and each bid includes
a quantity to be supplied and a cost for generating that power. To minimize the total cost,
the power company determines the clearing price and each generator’s supply quantity.
Song and Liu (2000a) assumed that the supply quantity is a liner function of the price, and
other bidder’s biding is represented as a discrete random variable. Song and Liu (2000b)
expressed the procurement auction as a multi-period decision-making problem, and used
a discrete-state and discrete-time Markov decision process to select the optimal policy
from the discrete bidding strategy sets.
Ausubel and Cramton (2004) studied the theoretical and practical implementation of
a forward auction clearing price auction mechanism for divisible items. There are stud-
ies on the procurement auctions for multiple items. Chen, Roundy, Zhang, et al. (2005)
considered Vickrey auctions for procuring multiple items in supply chain settings by in-
corporating transportation costs into auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2006)
studied a hybrid auction mechanism based on clearing price auctions for multiple items
under the assumption that each bidder has only one unit item. Parkes and Kalagnanam
(2005) studied multi-attribute auctions that extend traditional auction settings to allow ne-
gotiation over non-price attributes such as weight and color. But under their framework
there is only one winner and so the auction corresponds to single item auctions.
Thepurposeofthispaperistogiveatheoreticalanalysisforpurchasingdivisibleitems
through the ﬁrst-price auction, where the auctioneer either does or does not compensate
the overage supply quantity. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we give the system model. Sections 3 studies the non-compensated case, and Section 4
studies the compensated case. Section 5 discusses the property of bidding prices in the
case of two bidders. In Section 6, a numerical analysis is given to illustrate the models
and results. Section 7 gives the conclusion.
2 System Model
An auctioneer plans to purchase some divisible items with a quantity of D via a ﬁrst-
price sealed-bid auction. It is assumed that there are n+1 supply bidders attending
the auction. Each bidder’s bidding price and bidding (supply) quantity are private and
symmetric, i.e., each bidder knows his own bidding price and bidding quantity, yet only
knows other bidders’ bidding prices and bidding quantities as random variables which
are draw identically and independently from distribution functions F(⋅) and G(⋅), respec-
tively. Suppose F(⋅) has a ﬁnite support set [b,b].
Suppose that a bidder, say bidder A, submits his bidding price b and supply quantity
q, respectively, and that the biding prices of all other n bidders are b1 ≤b2 ≤...≤bn in an
ascending order, with the corresponding supply quantities being q1,q2,...,qn. Note that
b0 = b and bn+1 = b. Moreover, suppose that bidder A has a unit production cost c.
Obviously, for the auction we are concerned with here, the bidder’s expected proﬁt is
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production capacity. Hence, the only problem left for the bidder is to decide his optimal
bidding price.
Before further discussion, we will introduce the following well-known lemma (see
Deng and Liang (1998)).
Lemma 1.
AssumethatX1,X2,...,Xn areindependentlyidenticallydistributed(i.i.d.) variablesdrawn
from the distribution function F(x) and the probability density function f(x). Then, the
probability density function (p.d.f.) of the kth lowest variable of X1,X2,...,Xn is
fk(x) = n
(
n−1
k−1
)
F(x)k−1(1−F(x))n−k f(x).
3 Non-compensating the Overage Supply Quantity
Obviously, for bidder A’s bid b, there must exist some j = 0,1,...,n such that b ∈
(bj,bj+1]. Consider the following two cases.
(i)Iftheﬁrst j bidder’stotalsupplyquantitydoesnotsatisfythedemand, i.e., ∑
j
i=1qi <
D, then bidder A wins the auction, and his clearing quantity is q if his supply quantity q
is less than the demand gap D−∑
j
i=1qi; otherwise, his clearing quantity is D−∑
j
i=1qi.
Hence, the proﬁt of bidder A is
(b−c)min
{
q,D−
j
∑
i=1
qi
}
=
⎧
  ⎨
  ⎩
(b−c)q, q ≤ D−
j
∑
i=1
qi
(b−c)
(
D−
j
∑
i=1
qi
)
, 0 < D−
j
∑
i=1
qi ≤ q.
(ii) If the ﬁrst j bidders’ total supply quantity satisﬁes the demand, i.e., ∑
j
i=1qi ≥ D,
then bidder A loses the auction and his proﬁt is 0.
Let x+ = max{x,0} be the positive part of real x. Thus, Dj :=
(
D−∑
j
i=1qi
)+
is
the gap between the demand and the total supply quantity of the ﬁrst j bidders. Due to
b ∈ (bj,bj+1], bidder A’s proﬁt is (b−c)min
{
q,Dj
}
.
By summarizing the two cases above, we get the proﬁt of bidder A as follows:
rFN(b;c,q,b1,...,bn;q1,...,qn) = (b−c)min{q,Dj}, bj < b ≤ bj+1, j = 0,1,...,n. (1)
Therefore, the expected proﬁt of bidder A is
RFN(b;c,q) = Ebj,qj,j=1,2,...,nrFN(b;c,q,b1,...,bn;q1,...,qn)
= (b−c)
n
∑
j=0
Emin{q,Dj}[Pr{b ≤ bj+1}−Pr{b ≤ bj}].
For convenience, denote that
aj(q) := Emin{q,Dj−1}−Emin{q,Dj}, j = 1,2,...,n, an+1(q) := Emin{q,Dn}.
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Lemma 1. Let ¯ Fj(b)=1−Fj(b) and fj(b) be the probability density function of bj. Then
the bidder’s expected proﬁt above can be rewritten as
RFN(b;c,q) = (b−c)
n+1
∑
j=1
aj(q) ¯ Fj(b). (2)
Hence, bidder A’s problem is to ﬁnd an optimal bidding price b to maximize his ex-
pected proﬁt, i.e.,
RFN(c,q) := max
b≤b≤b
RFN(b;c,q). (3)
Following the ﬁrst order condition, the maximum of RFN(b;c,q) must satisfy that
b−
n
∑
j=1
aj(q) ¯ Fj(b)+an+1(q)
n
∑
j=1
aj(q)fj(b)
= c. (4)
In general, the solutions to the above equation are not unique. Let B be the set of all
solutions to equation (4) that lie in [b,b]. If B is not empty, let b′ =argmaxb∈BRFN(b;c,q)
be the bidding price with the maximal value among B. Then the bidder’s optimal bidding
strategy is given by
bFN(c,q) = argmax{RFN(b′;c,q),RFN(b;c,q),RFN(b;c,q)} (5)
where due to ¯ Fj(b) = 1 and ¯ Fj(b) = 0 for all j ≤ n,
RFN(b;c,q) = (b−c)Emin{q,D}, RFN(b;c,q) = (b−c)Emin
{
q,
(
D−
n
∑
i=1
qi
)+}
.
We now can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
The bidder’s optimal bidding strategy bFN(c,q) exists and is increasing in c. Moreover,
bFN(c,q) is an interior point of [b,b] when c ∈ (b,b) and D < ∑
n
i=1qi.
Proof. (1) The existence of the optimal bidding strategy is obvious since RFN(b;c,q) is
continuous in the closed interval [b,b].
(2) In order to show the monotone of bFN(c,q), due to Theorem 3.3 in Hu and Liu
(2000) about properties of modular functions, it sufﬁces to verify that RFN(b;c,q) is sub-
modular in (b,c). But this is obvious from the following fact:
∂2RFN(b;c,q)
∂b∂c
=
n
∑
j=1
aj(q)fj(b) ≥ 0.
(3) When c∈(b,b) and D<∑
n
i=1qi, it is easy to see that RFN(b;c,q)=RFN(b;c,q)=
0. So, bFN(c,q) ∈ (b,b).
The theorem above tells us that bidders always have their optimal bidding prices,
which increase with their production costs. Moreover, when the unit cost lies in the
interval [b,b] and the total production capacity of all bidders can satisfy the auctioneer’s
demand, the optimal bidding price lies also in the interior of the interval [b,b].
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In this section, we consider the case where the auctioneer compensates for an over-
supply. Then, once a bidder wins the auction, his clearing quantity equals his bidding
quantity. Similar to equation (2), we can obtain the expected proﬁt of bidder A as fol-
lows:
RFC(b;c,q) = (b−c)q
n
∑
j=0
Pr
{
D >
j
∑
i=1
qi
}
Pr{bj < b ≤ bj+1}.
For convenience, denote that Aj := Pr{∑
j−1
i=1 qi < D ≤ ∑
j
i=1qi} for j = 1,2,...,n, and
An+1 := Pr{D > ∑
n
i=1qi}. Then, bidder A’s expected proﬁt can be rewritten as follows:
RFC(b;c,q) = q(b−c)
n+1
∑
j=1
Aj ¯ Fj(b) := qRFC(b;c). (6)
So, bidder A’s problem is as follows:
RFC(c,q) = q max
b≤b≤b
RFC(b;c). (7)
Certainly, the optimal bidding price, denoted by bFC(c), is independent of q, the supply
quantity. Following the ﬁrst order condition, one can obtain the following equation for
the optimal bidding price:
b−
n
∑
j=1
Aj ¯ Fj(b)+An+1
n
∑
j=1
Aj fj(b)
= c. (8)
This is similar to equation (4) for the non-compensating case with the unique difference
being that Aj here is independent of q.
Let B1 be the set of all solutions of the above equation that lie in [b,b]. If B1 is not
empty, let
b′
1(c) = argmax
b∈B1
RFC(b;c)
be the bidding price with the maximal value among B1. Then the bidder’s optimal bidding
strategy is
bFC(c) = argmax{RFC(b′(c);c),RFC(b;c),RFC(b;c)} (9)
where
RFC(b;c) = (b−c),RFC(b;c) = (b−c)P
{
n
∑
i=1
qi < D
}
.
Similar to Theorem 1, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
The bidder’s optimal bidding strategy bFC(c) exists, is independent of q, and is increasing
in c.
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Theorems 1 and 2, respectively.
Theorem 3.
RFC(c,q) ≥ RFN(c,q), i.e., bidders can gain more proﬁt in the case where the auctioneer
compensates for an oversupply.
Proof. Since min{q,(D−∑
j
i=1qi)+} ≤ q if D > ∑
j
i=1qi, and = 0 otherwise, we thus have
Emin{q,Dj}≤qPr{D>∑
j
i=1qi}. Substituting the above formulas into equations (2) and
(6), we can obtain that for any given b, RFN(b;c,q) ≤ RFC(b;c,q). Thus,
RFN(c,q) = max
b
RFN(b;c,q) ≤ max
b
RFC(b;c,q) = RFC(c,q).
This completes the proof.
The result given in the theorem above is clear.
5 Property of Bidding Prices in the Case of Two Bidders
In this section, we will discuss property of bidding prices in the case where there are
two bidders, i.e. n = 1. Following from equations (2) and (6), we can obtain that
RFN(b;c,q) =
{
(b−c)[ ¯ F(b)(q−ϕ(q))+ϕ(q)] q ≤ D
(b−c)[ ¯ F(b)(D−ϕ(D))+ϕ(D)] q ≥ D (10)
where
ϕ(q) = Emin{q,(D−q1)+} =
∫ q
0
G(D−x)dx,
RFC(b;c) = (b−c)[ ¯ F(b)+F(b)G(D)]
= (1−G(D))(b−c)
(
¯ F(b)+
G(D)
1−G(D)
)
. (11)
Lemma 2.
(1) The bidder’s bidding strategy bFN(c,q) is decreasing in q and;
(2) bFN(c,q) ≤ bFC(c), i.e. the bidder will bid higher in the case where they will be
compensated.
Proof. (1) It will be proved in the following two cases.
(i) If q ≥ D, then RFN(b;c,q) = (b−c)[ ¯ F(b)(D−ϕ(D))+ϕ(D)] is independent in q,
so that bFN(c,q) is independent in q;
(ii) If q ≤ D, then
RFN(b;c,q) = (b−c)[ ¯ F(b)(q−ϕ(q))+ϕ(q)] = (q−ϕ(q))(b−c)
(
¯ F(b)+
1
q/ϕ(q)−1
)
.
Since ϕ(q) = Emin{q,(D−q1)+} < q, then that the bidder’s problem can be written
as
RFN(c,q) = max
b≤b≤b
RFN(b;c,q) = (q−ϕ(q)) max
b≤b≤b
ψ(b : c,q)
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(
¯ F(b)+ 1
q/ϕ(q)−1
)
.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, ψ(b : c,q) is submodular in (b,c), which implies
that bFN(c,q) is decreasing in q. So we only need to verify the submodularity of ψ(b :
c,q).
Because
dq/ϕ(q)
q
=
∫ q
0 G(D−x)dx−qG(D−q)
ϕ2(q)
≥
∫ q
0 G(D−q)dx−qG(D−q)
ϕ2(q)
= 0
means that q/ϕ(q) is increasing in q, then
∂ψ(b : c,q)
∂b
=
d
db
[(b−c) ¯ F(b)]+
1
q/ϕ(q)−1
is decreasing in q. This means that the submodularity of ψ(b : c,q).
By summarizing the two cases above, we can obtain that bFN(c,q) is decreasing in q.
(2) Because q/ϕ(q) is increasing in q, then 1
q/ϕ(q)−1 is decreasing in q. And also
because
lim
q→0
1
q/ϕ(q)−1
= lim
q→0
ϕ(q)
q−ϕ(q)
= (lim
q→0
ϕ′(q)
1−ϕ′(q)
=
G(D)
1−G(D)
,
then 1
q/ϕ(q)−1 ≤
G(D)
1−G(D).
Following the submodularity property, it is obvious that the optimal solution of
maxb{(b−c)[ ¯ F(b)+y]} is increasing in y. Hence, bFN(c,q) ≤ bFC(c).
6 A Numerical Example
The buyer purchases 2,000 tons of a product, and the bidder’s bidding price will not
exceed 500 dollar/ton. Each bidder is uncertain about the other bidders’ bidding prices
and supply quantities, but knows that the bidding prices follow a uniform distribution over
the interval [10,50], and the supply quantity has a probability of 1/4 for 700, 800, 900,
and 1,000 tons, respectively. The supply quantity (capacity) of bidder A is 900 tons.
Substituting the parameters into the non-compensating model and the compensating
model respectively, the optimal bidding strategy and the expected proﬁt of bidder A in
both case can be obtained, as shown in Table 1, for varying production costs.
Table 1. Bidder’s optimal bidding strategy and expected proﬁt for the ﬁrst-price auction.
Cost Non-compensating Compensating
Bidding price Expected proﬁt Bidding price Expected proﬁt
100 257 85050 292 119841
150 282 60092 310 90112
200 309 39635 331 63779
250 339 23851 354 41506
300 369 12607 379 23891
350 401 5451 407 11318
400 434 1643 436 3759
450 467 208 467 525
A Study of First-price Sealed-bid Procurement Auctions for Divisible Items 415The results in Table 1 show that (1) the bidder’s bidding price increases with the cost,
while the expected proﬁt decreases with the cost; and (2) bidders will bid lower prices and
then obtain lower proﬁts in the non-compensating case than those in the compensating
case. These illustrate the results given in Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
7 Conclusions
Thispaperstudiedﬁrst-pricesealed-bidprocurementauctions, inwhichtheauctioneer
either does or does not compensate for an over supply in the quantity of the item being
traded. We obtained the optimal bidding strategy for the bidder (supplier), and showed
that the bidding price increases along with the unit cost. Moreover, we showed that the
bidder can gain more proﬁt when the auctioneer compensates for an oversupply.
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